Kornblith’s “thought experiment” is certainly interesting and imaginative, but speculative. Even though much care is clearly taken to consider only reasonable historical possibilities, Kornblith’s argument – that “a victory by Henry Clay in the 1844 presidential election” would have prevented the Mexican-American War and, therefore, the Civil War – seems like a bit of a stretch sometimes.
Kornblith begins by analyzing the election itself, as a way to legitimize his speculation by pointing out how “highly plausible” it was. Although Polk and Clay had very different political opinions, Clay’s unwillingness to fight for the annexation of Texas, a motive “pregnant with… fatal consequences” mostly affected Polk’s standing in the south, where Kornblith claims “the Democratic issue of Texas had driven Whig economic issues from the center ring of the southern political arena,” particularly because it was closely tied to the issue of slavery. Kornblith points out, however, that the North was more important to the election in the end, and that “the distribution and magnitude of the immigrant vote” ultimately doomed Clay. Kornblith believes, therefore, that his alternate history has merit, since it was by such a slim margin that it did not occur in the first place.
Kornblith goes on to describe Clay’s policies in office, specifically regarding westward expansion. Clay “did not consider the annexation of Texas essential to the national interest,” and certainly opposed going to war over it. He believed in a “free and autonomous Texas” being the best choice for the nation, and according to Kornblith this position would extend to “collaboration between the United States and Great Britain.” This cooperation, in turn, would affect further expansion like that into the Oregon territory and California, where Clay would have continued to reflect his pacifist view and focus on other issues instead, thus avoiding conflict with Mexico.
Kornblith also posits that Clay’s presidency would have strengthened the second party system, not only by promoting different policies from Polk such as a national bank and federal aid, but by avoiding the polarizing question of slavery. “Without the Mexican-American war,“ Kornblith suggests, “there would have been no Wilmot Proviso… no debate in the late 1840s over the status of slavery.” Clay’s America was one where the issue of slavery was in “the background of national politics,” thus avoiding the sectional conflict that lead to the Civil War.
Kornblith goes on to discuss the future of slavery and antislavery under Clay, one where slavery could go without being a major national issue until well into, or even past, the 19th century, and perhaps where a peaceful end to slavery could be achieved, as it was in Brazil. However, his main point remains that, under Clay and without the Mexican-American War, America might have avoided the Civil War entirely.
I am somewhat unsure of whether or not I am persuaded by Kornblith’s arguments. On the one hand, it certainly bothers me how speculative his case is, and how many specific events in the history of a nation as complex as the United States he claims would have gone a certain way with only the election of Clay as a major catalyst. For example, Kornblith assumes that, “absent other evidence of southern aggression, most northern whites would probably have accepted a moderately strengthened fugitive slave law as a reasonable concession to southern interests.” However, I find it hard to believe that, given the obvious differences between the North and the South – Clay or no Clay – and the tender nature of arguments regarding slavery, the nation wouldn’t have been torn by any federal choices involving slavery. Kornblith stays as true to history as he can while making his argument, but some of the assumptions still seem weak.
However, I tend to disagree with fundamentalist ideas, as described by Kornblith and our discussions in class, and Kornblith has actually done a relatively good job of further convincing me to reject those ideas. Regardless of whether or not his argument is totally plausible, Kornblith does make one thing very clear: there were many factors involved in the start of the Civil War; so, it seems unrealistic to believe that the war was inevitable. If even one of those factors had changed, be it Clay’s election to office or something like the United States failing to secure Texas and other western territories, there is still a chance that the Civil War could have been avoided, or perhaps delayed. The North and South were certainly different social systems, but that alone was not the cause of the war. Else, as we asked in class, how did the United States avoid secession for so long? Fundamentalists’ approach to the causes behind the Civil War Is too black and white for my tastes, and so I can’t help but agree with Kornblith to some extent.